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Abstract
With the emergence of quantum computing and quantum networks, many communication protocols that
take advantage of the unique properties of quantum mechanics to achieve a secure bidirectional exchange of
information, have been proposed. In this study, we propose a new quantum communication protocol, called
Continuous Quantum Secure Dialogue (CQSD), that allows two parties to continuously exchange messages
without halting while ensuring the privacy of the conversation. Compared to existing protocols, CQSD improves
the efficiency of quantum communication. In addition, we offer an implementation of the CQSD protocol using
the Qiskit framework. Finally, we conduct a security analysis of the CQSD protocol in the context of several
common forms of attack.
1 Introduction
In today’s world where electronic transmission of data plays a
vital role in all kinds of communications, its security has become
one of the most pressing concerns. Although classical encryp-
tion algorithms have been in use and many of them are proven
difficult to crack, the development of quantum computing and
quantum cryptography [1–4], including Shor’s algorithm [5],
have made these classical encryption algorithms no longer im-
pregnable. For example, the RSA algorithm has been tradition-
ally considered difficult to break, but as Ekert showed in 1996,
the presumed intractability of factoring large numbers, which
algorithms like RSA depend upon, is threatened by the rise of
quantum algorithms [6]. Thus, in the quantum era, we need
efficient communication protocols that remain robust against
both classical and quantum attacks. Fortunately, quantum cryp-
tography promises a new level of security that can be achieved
thanks to the unique principles of quantum mechanics. As one
of the earliest quantum communication protocols, Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) focuses on distributing a random public
key securely to the two communicating parties who would then
use the key as a one-time pad to encrypt their messages and
transmit them through a classical channel. The most notable
QKD protocols are BB84 (the original QKD protocol by Bennett
and Brassard) [7] and E91 [8]. Today, QKD has been one of
the most studied protocols and has been deployed in certain
industrial settings [9–12]. With the study of quantum networks,
the practicality of quantum communication is being scrutinized
and further improved [13–15].
Since then, as an alternative to QKD, Quantum Secure Di-
rect Communication (QSDC) has been put forward and actively
studied [16–24]. Despite sharing a general goal with QKD,
QSDC does not rely on classical channel to transmit encrypted
information but rather transmit the encrypted messages through
the quantum channel directly. Several QSDC protocols exploit
Correspondence should be addressed to: sl4299@columbia.edu
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs [25] to prevent informa-
tion leakage [22–24]. In 2003 Deng et al. demonstrated the
QSDC protocol [20] and later Wang et al. presented a similar
protocol with improved capacity using high-dimension super-
dense coding [21].
Based on QSDC, a new category of quantum communication
protocol, Quantum Secure Direct Dialogue (QSDD), is recently
proposed [26]. QSDC and QSDD shares many common fea-
tures, such as transmitting information through the quantum
channel solely [27], but the latter enables users to communicate
bidirectionally, which is of practical importance. Until now,
two QSDD protocols have been introduced [26, 27], but they
both have one crucial disadvantage: the communication over
QSDD has to halt after one cycle of information exchange due
to the depletion of EPR pairs. In order to continue the exchange,
a new handshake between two parties has to be performed to
re-establish a secure communication channel. This redundancy
of security checks thus creates an unnecessary overhead. By
contrast, our proposed protocol, CQSD, has no such inefficiency.
In CQSD, every message sent not only transmits information,
but also reserves capacity of the next message. Therefore, the
two parties can exchange information without interruptions until
one of the parties actively closes the channel. Since CQSD elim-
inates the overhead of redundant initialization, it allows for a
"continuous" dialogue. Furthermore, we have shown that CQSD
is safe when facing three general forms of attack.
2 Theoretical Preparation
The Bell states are four specific quantum states of two qubits
being maximally entangled, as shown below:∣∣∣Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(∣∣∣00〉 + ∣∣∣11〉 ) (1)∣∣∣Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(∣∣∣00〉 − ∣∣∣11〉 ) (2)∣∣∣Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(∣∣∣01〉 + ∣∣∣10〉 ) (3)∣∣∣Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(∣∣∣01〉 − ∣∣∣10〉 ) (4)
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2A maximally entangled qubit pair is also known as an EPR
pair. Through quantum entanglement of the Bell states, we
can conduct a Bell inequality check to detect the presence of
eavesdroppers or any systematic malfunction in a quantum com-
munication channel that can compromise the security and the
reliability of the channel.
Now we define the following operators:
U1 =
∣∣∣0〉 〈0∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣1〉 〈1∣∣∣ (5)
U2 =
∣∣∣0〉 〈1∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣1〉 〈0∣∣∣ (6)
U3 =
∣∣∣0〉 〈0∣∣∣ − ∣∣∣1〉 〈1∣∣∣ (7)
U4 =
∣∣∣0〉 〈1∣∣∣ − ∣∣∣1〉 〈0∣∣∣ (8)
Note that these operations correspond to certain quantum
gates in a quantum circuit implementation. Every operation
performed on one qubit of an EPR pair encodes 2 bits of
classical information. When the encoded qubit is sent to the
other user holding the other qubit of the EPR pair, the recipient
can then recover the information from the pair. See the table
below for the operator to use given bit strings to be encoded:
Table 1: Operator, corresponding gate, and message
Operator Quantum Gate Message
U1 I 11
U2 X 10
U3 Z 01
U4 ZX 00
3 The Continuous Quantum Secure Dialogue
(CQSD) Protocol
In the CQSD protocol, two communicators, Alice and Bob,
intend to communicate with each other directly over a quantum
channel, whereas an eavesdropper, Eve, is trying to eavesdrop
on this dialogue. Prior to the conversation, Alice and Bob would
need to agree on the relationship between the operators (U1, U2,
U3, U4) and the corresponding two-bit classical messages. In
addition, Alice and Bob should agree on the party initiating the
dialogue.
The CQSD protocol begins with the initialization of a secure
quantum channel, which requires the initiator of the conversation
to prepare and send over qubits to the other party. After a secure
channel has been established between Alice and Bob, whenever
one party intends to communicate with the other, that party
will send three groups of qubits: 1) the qubits that carry the
message to be transmitted, 2) the qubits that are used to conduct
an eavesdropping check for the current transmission, and 3) the
new Bell states to be used in the next exchange. The preservation
of readily available EPR pairs is the key to allow for continuous
exchange. Here we introduce the steps of the CQSD protocol in
detail.
Figure 1: Schematic illustration of CQSD. (a) Alice initiates the
communication channel and sends information to Bob. (b) Bob
sends information back to Alice. (c) Alice and Bob transmit
information to each other simultaneously. Note that Ψ− is the
initialized state of a qubit and the Bell state used for eavesdrop-
per checks. Message qubit indicates the qubit state with the
message encoded according to the encoding operators.
3Step 1. Initial Preparation
Alice (or Bob, whomever the two parties designate as the initia-
tor) prepares 2(m + n) Bell-state pairs, where m is the number
of message qubit pairs and n is the number of “eavesdropper
check” qubit pairs that can be sent in one transmission. The
choice of m and n can be based on the physical capacity of the
device used. After the decision is made by either Alice or Bob,
it can be publicly announced. The same m and n will be applied
during the entire communication. Similar to QSDD, Alice (and
later Bob) prepares all the EPR pairs as
∣∣∣Ψ−〉 [26]. Both Alice
and Bob will keep using that state to create EPR pairs during
the conversation until the conversation stops. From each EPR
pair, Alice sends one of the entangled qubits to Bob.
Step 2. Establishing a Secure Channel
After Bob has received 2(m + n) halves of the EPR pairs from
Alice, Alice randomly selects m + n particles from her 2(m + n)
halves as initial check pairs and notify the other party of their
positions. Note that the initial security check uses more qubits
than subsequent checks. Alice then publicly announces the
positions of the check pairs as well as a measuring basis for each
pair. Alice and Bob then perform measurements on all of their
check qubits in the previously specified bases. After obtaining
all the measurements, Alice or Bob can publicly compare the
measurements, from which they can measure the error rate of the
check pairs. If the quantum communication channel is devoid
of an eavesdropper, then Alice and Bob will obtain perfectly
anti-correlated measurements and can continue onto the next
step. Whereas if there is a third party Eve eavesdropping on
the communication, the measurements obtained by Alice and
Bob will be disturbed and no longer perfectly anti-correlated. In
that case, Alice and Bob terminate the communication directly,
forestalling any potential information leakage.
Step 3. Alice Speaks to Bob
So far, on either Alice’s or Bob’s computer, there are exactly
m + n halves of EPR pairs remaining. Alice can then select n
qubits at random positions as the check qubits for a specific
transmission. She then selects m qubits to encode her message
using the unitary operations specified in Table 1. During the
encoding process, Alice prepares two groups of new EPR pairs:
the first group has the n qubits and the second group has m
qubits. If Alice is only using one qubit for the eavesdropper test
and one qubit for sending the message, in this scheme, she needs
to send four qubits total: one of them being the message qubit,
one of them being the eavesdropper test qubit, and two of them
being the two entangled qubits from the two new EPR pairs.
Alice then sends the qubits over to Bob. After Bob receives the
qubits, Alice announces the positions of the eavesdropper test
qubits. Subsequently, Bob can perform Bell state measurements
on the eavesdropper test qubit pairs and see if the measurements
are perfectly anti-correlated in randomly selected bases. If so,
the previous transaction is secure. If the results are not perfectly
opposite, Alice and Bob would stop the communication imme-
diately, preventing the potential leakage of information. Being
sure the communication is secure, he then can perform Bell
measurements to read out the message encoded. After obtaining
the message, Bob can store the rest of m + n halves of EPR pairs
for the next information exchange. For both Alice and Bob, the
number of available entangled EPR pairs is unchanged, so that
both parties are immediately ready for the next transmission.
Step 4. Bob Speaks to Alice
Due to CQSD’s nature of preserving the number of entangled
EPR pairs after each transmission, Bob can immediately send
messages back to Alice without re-initializing the communica-
tion channel. So far, on either Alice’s or Bob’s computer, there
are exactly m + n halves of EPR pairs remaining. Bob can select
n qubits at random positions as the check qubits and select the
remaining m qubits to encode his message using the unitary op-
erations specified in Table 1. During the encoding process, Bob
also prepares two groups of new EPR pairs: the first group has
the n qubits and the second group has m qubits. Bob then sends
the qubits over to Alice. After Alice has received the qubits, Bob
similarly announces the position of the eavesdropper test qubit.
Alice then performs Bell state measurement on the eavesdropper
test qubit pairs in randomly selected bases. The check pairs
should yield anti-correlated results unless an eavesdropper Eve
is present. If Alice and Bob detect Eve, they would again stop
the communication and thereby prevent any information leakage.
Otherwise, Alice can decode the entangled message qubits and
retrieve the information. Now Alice and Bob again both have
m + n halves of EPR pairs. This continuous cycle proceeds until
one party decides to terminate the dialogue.
4 CQSD Implementation and Simulation
We have implemented a simulation of the CQSD protocol using
Qiskit. In the simulation, we set up a 12-qubit circuit to simulate
the communication between two users, Alice and Bob, each
of whom has a 6-qubit quantum computer. The simulation is
broken down into three sections: 1. the initial eavesdropper
check; 2. Alice speaks to Bob; 3. Bob speaks to Alice. The
implementation strictly follows the CQSD protocol specification.
Yet, certain details which are currently unable to be implemented
are replaced by certain assumptions. One notable assumption is
that the transmissions of qubits between users are seamless and
perfect. Under this assumption, we are able to split the qubits
on the simulation machine into two groups, namely Alice’s and
Bob’s, and directly operate on them.
In Figure 2, part A corresponds to step 1 in Figure 1; part B
corresponds to step 2.1 to 2.3; part C corresponds to step 3.1;
part D corresponds to step 3.2; part E, F and G correspond to
step 3.3 and 3.4; part H corresponds to step 4.1 and 4.2; part J,
K and L correspond to step 4.3 and 4.4.
Because the CQSD implementation is a faithful representa-
tion of the CQSD protocol in action, it is apparent that many of
the benefits of CQSD are taking effect. For example, the eaves-
dropper checks at the beginning and during each transmission
can effectively detect the presence of an eavesdropper and halt
the transmission, preventing any leakage of information. To
see this mechanism in action, we reset one of the eavesdropper
check qubit in the source code, which is detected by the pro-
tocol immediately and triggers the halt. When the disturbance
introduced by the eavesdropper is removed, the messages are
successfully transmitted and the information exchange can be
carried out continuously until the end.
4Figure 2: The quantum circuit implementation of the CQSD protocol
5 Security Analysis
The CQSD protocol aims to ensure security while enabling
continuous communication. Several types of common eaves-
dropping attacks and the robustness of CQSD against them will
be discussed in this section.
The first type is called the "intercept-and-resend" attack, in
which malicious user Eve intercepts a state being transmitted,
retrieves information from the state, and later re-sends the state
to the target user. In CQSD, the initial eavesdropper check and
the per-transmission eavesdropper check can effectively protect
against the intercept-and-resend attack. Assume, without the
loss of generality, that Eve is intercepting some of the qubits
Alice is trying to send to Bob. In order to perform the attack, Eve
measures the qubits in some bases and sends out new ones based
on the results. However, the new ones Eve sends to Bob are
not entangled with Bob’s qubits, so the perfect anti-correlation
wouldn’t be observed and thus the protocol would alarm Bob.
Besides, Eve’s measurements of the intercepted qubits would
not help when there is an sufficient amount of check qubits as
there is no guarantee that she could pick the same measurement
bases that would be chosen by Bob later.
The second type of attack is the Trojan horse attack, where a
malicious eavesdropper probes Alice’s apparatus by occupying
a part of the quantum channel [28]. Similar to the analysis of
preventing this type of attack for QSDD [26], CQSD can be
made safe from the attack using solutions such as installing
numerous of photon number splitters (PNS) and filters to detect
and exclude invisible photons as well as delayed photons [29].
The detection of intruding particles can be supported by CQSD’s
fixed message size. Compared to other communication proto-
cols, which theoretically allow for an arbitrary message size
within the device capacity, CQSD imposes a fixed message size
to achieve the continuity of message exchange. If the number of
incoming particles does not match with CQSD’s fixed message
size, the device running CQSD can easily identify the presence
of intruding particles injected by the malicious user and halt the
communication.
Man-in-the-middle attack is another attack pattern in which
an eavesdropper acts as the facilitator of the communication
between Alice and Bob without them knowing, receiving all
the messages coming from both parties. Prior research tackles
this issue by the distribution of pre-shared secrets, which can be
achieved through a variety of techniques [30, 31].
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we propose the Continuous Quantum Secure Dia-
logue (CQSD) protocol, offer an implementation of the protocol,
and analyze its security against common types of attack. CQSD
demonstrates an improvement over existing protocols by offer-
ing continuous message flow. Though the protocol design is
proposed here, future research is needed to thoroughly assess
the CQSD protocol. These research areas include a comparative
analysis on the difference between the performance of CQSD
and those of other protocols, resource consumption required
by CQSD on a quantum machine, implementing CQSD in an
experimental setting with photonic devices, as well as general-
ization of CQSD in higher dimensions. One important area, as
we would emphasize for all communication protocols, is their
robustness under noisy settings. Analyzing the performance
of protocols in quantum networks with different capacities can
offer a more comprehensive insight into the actual effectiveness
of the protocols [32]. It is necessary that future studies on CQSD
be addressing these various affairs.
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